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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ 
Respondent, 
vs. 
ROBERT EUGENE JONES, 
Defendant/ 
Appellant. 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
Jurisdiction to hear the above-entitled appeal is 
conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann, 
§78-2-2(3) (i) (1988) and Utah Code Ann. §77-35-26 (2) (a) (1987). 
This appeal is from a conviction of Murder in the First Degree, a 
Capital Offense, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202; and 
Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony, pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. §76-6-203; and Attempted Murder, a Second Degree Felony, a 
Lesser Included Offense of the charge of Attempted Murder in the 
Second Degree, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203 and §76-4-102 
(2) in the Second Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State 
of Utah, the Honorable David E. Roth presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BASED ON INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
1. COUNSEL GINGER FLETCHER DID NOT BRING TO LIGHT 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Supreme Court No. 880298 
Priority No. 1 
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IN ANY MANNER DEFENDANT'S MENTAL 
ILLNESS/DISORDERS, EVEN THOUGH AMPLE EVIDENCE 
WAS AVAILABLE REGARDING A LONG HISTORY OF 
MENTAL ILLNESS SUFFERED BY DEFENDANT. 
2. COUNSEL DID NOT PURSUE THE OBVIOUS THEME OF THE 
CASE, EVEN AFTER HAVING AGREED TO DO SO. 
3. COUNSEL FAILED TO CONSULT WITH DEFENDANT ON KEY 
ISSUES, AND MISLED DEFENDANT. 
4. COUNSEL MISLED DEFENDANT BY HAVING 23 WITNESSES 
SUBPOENAED, BUT CALLING ONLY THREE TO TESTIFY. 
5. COUNSEL FAILED TO ADEQUATELY CROSS-EXAMINE 
CERTAIN KEY WITNESSES. 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202, Murder in the First Degree: 
"(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the first 
degree if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes 
the death of another under any of the following 
circumstances: 
"(c) The actor knowingly created a great risk of death 
to a person other than the victim and the actor. 
"(d) The homicide was committed while the actor was 
engaged in the commission of or an attempt to commit or 
flight after committing or attempting to 
commit...aggravated burglary, burglary. . ." 
"(2) Murder in the First Degree is a capital offense." 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-203, Aggravated Burglary: 
"A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if in 
attempting, committing, or fleeing from a burglary the 
actor or another participant in the crime: (a) causes 
bodily injury to any person who is not a participant in 
the crime; (b) uses or threatens the immediate use of a 
dangerous or deadly weapon against any person who is 
not a participant in the crime; or (c) is armed with a 
deadly weapon or possesses or attempts to use any 
explosive or deadly weapon." 
-5-
"(2) Aggravated burglary is a first degree felony." 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-202, Burglary: 
"(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or 
remains unlawfully in a building or any portion of a 
building with intent to commit a felony or theft or 
commit an assault on any person. 
"(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless 
it was committed in a dwelling, which event it is a 
felony of the second degree. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-5-203, Murder in the Second Degree: 
"(1) Criminal homicide constitutes murder in the 
second degree if the actor: (a) intentionally or 
knowingly causes the death of another; (b) intending to 
cause serious bodily injury to another, he commits an 
act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the 
death of another; (c) acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, he 
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death 
to another and thereby causes the death of another; or 
(d) while in the commission, attempted commission, or 
immediately flight from the commission or attempted 
commission.. .aggravated burglary, burglary...causes the 
death of another person other than the party as defined 
in §76-2-202. 
"(2) Murder in the Second Degree is a Felony of the 
First Degree." 
Utah Code Ann. §76-4-102, Attempt - Classification of Offenses: 
"Criminal attempt to commit: ...(2) a felony in the 
first degree is a felony of the second degree..." 
Rules 
Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4, Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration (1988), Communication: 
"(a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed 
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information. 
"(b) A lawyer shall explain a matter to tfre extent 
reasonably necessary to enable the client to make 
informed decisions regarding the representation." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant/ ROBERT EUGENE JONES/ was charged on or about 
March 14/ 1983/ by Information with Murder in the First Degree, a 
Capital Offense; Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony; and 
Attempted Murder in the First Degree, a First Degree Felony (R. 
1/ 2/ 3). Defendant was convicted as charged in a trial by jury 
held August 29/ 1983/ through September 7, 1983/ in the Second 
Judicial District Court, the Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, presiding 
(R. 68-83). On September 15/ 1983/ Judge Hyde sentenced 
Defendant to the Utah State Prison for terms as follows: Life on 
the charge of Murder in the First Degree, a Capital Offense; Not 
Less than Five Years and May Be for Life on the charge of 
Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree Felony; and Not Less than 
Five Years and May Be for Life on the charge of Attempted 
Criminal Homicide, First Degree Felony (R. 149-151, 155). The 
sentences were run concurrent (R. 170). A Notice of Appeal was 
filed on October 13, 1983 (R. 166). 
Defendant's case was reversed on appeal by the Utah 
Supreme Court February 26, 1987, and remanded for a new trial (R. 
1851) (see Utah Supreme Court's decision [Addendum, Exhibit 13]). 
Attorney Ginger Fletcher entered as counsel for Defendant on 
April 28, 1987 (R. I860). Defendant was convicted in a second 
trial by jury held June 22-30, 1987, in the Second Judicial 
District court, the Honorable David E. Roth presiding (R. 1906-
1916, 2095, 2099, 2105) . When Defendant was convicted the second 
time, he was convicted of the following offenses: Murder in the 
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First Degree (R. 2099); Aggravated Burglary (2105); and of lesser 
included offense of Attempted Second Degree Murder, a Second 
Degree Felony (R. 2095) . 
On July 13/ 1987/ Defendant's attorney/ Ginger 
Fletcher, moved to withdraw as Defendant's counsel due to an 
apparent conflict with the Defendant/ which Motion was granted 
(R. 2108/ 2862-2863). Attorney Robert L. Froerer, an attorney 
with the Weber County Public Defenders Association/ entered as 
defense counsel July 20f 1987 (R. 2109). On September 2# 1987f 
Judge Roth sentenced the Defendant to the Utah State Prison for 
terms as follows: Life in Prison on the charge of Murder in the 
First Degree/ a Capital Offense; Not Less than Five Years and May 
Be for Life on the charge of Aggravated Burglary, a First Degree 
Felony (R. 2181); and Not Less then One nor More Than 15 Years on 
the charge of Attempted Second Degree Murder, a Second Degree 
Felony (R. 2183) . All sentencing terms were run concurrent (R. 
2129/ 2130) . 
Defendant filed/ pro se , a Motion for New Trial on the 
morning of September 9, 1987 (R. 2148)/ while on the same day in 
the afternoon Defendant's attorney, without knowledge of the 
prior filing by Defendant/ filed a Notice of Appeal (R, 2180/ 
2185). That appeal was subsequently voluntarily dismissed on 
defense counsel's motion on January 12/ 1988 (R. 2804). 
After some delay in Defendant's actions attempting to 
appoint new counsel (R. 2805/ et. seq.f 2836/ 2839)/ a hearing on 
Defendant's Motion for New Trial was held on July 19/ 1988 (R. 
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2845) , which Motion was denied by Judge Roth (R. 2848) . A Notice 
of Appeal was filed August 5, 1988 (R. 2851) . 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 11, 1983, Kim Chapman was shot and killed in 
the basement of his father's house. Concurrently, Beverly Jones, 
who was living with him at the time, was seriousLy wounded. 
Defendant Robert Jones was present in the Chapman house at the 
time of the shooting and was charged with Homicide, Attempted 
Homicide, and Aggravated Burglary. 
The legal issues raised in this appeal are related to a 
complex set of facts which were discovered subsequent to Mr. 
Jones0 first trial. 
In order to portray the facts which are pertinent to 
Defendant's true defense, Appellant will chronologically address 
the facts as they occurred in separate subsections of this 
Statement of Facts section of the brief. 
SUMMARY OF PERTINENT TRIAL TESTIMONY FROM DEFENDANT'S 
FIRST TRIAL 
The Defendant's first trial on these charges lasted 
some six days, as is evidenced by some 1,700 pages of transcript. 
The State contended that Defendant planned and calculated the 
death of Chapman and attempted to kill Beverly during the 
confrontation. The State contended that Defendant was a 
completely rational person, who only used previous suicide 
attempts and unusual behavior as a means of escaping punishment 
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when he had been acting contrary to accepted social behavior. 
The State did not call psychiatric or medical witnesses as to the 
mental capacity of the Defendant to form the required intent 
necessary for the conviction of these crimes, although the issue 
of Defendant's mental condition was raised during trial and 
argument. 
The defense argued that Defendant had been tormented by 
Beverly in her on-again, off-again behavior, and that because of 
his previous mental problems, he was especially susceptible to 
emotional trauma. Defense counsel argued that Defendant did not 
intend on harming either Chapman or Beverly, but that the 
shooting occurred only because Chapman polled a gun on Defendant 
as he was leaving the apartment. The defense contended that a 
struggle for the gun between Chapman and the Defendant resulted 
in the fatal wound to Chapman, and that Beverly Jones was hit by 
ricocheting bullets during the fight. The defense did not call 
psychiatric or medical witnesses as to the mental condition of 
the Defendant during this period of time, but argued he was under 
extreme emotional distress at the time of the shooting. 
The first trial included much testimony about the 
relationship between the Defendant and Beverly Jones regarding 
their on-again, off-again intimate relationship. In April 1981, 
she moved in with Defendant (R. 852). They separated in October 
1982 (R. 877 and 881). On February 17, 1983, Beverly Jones moved 
into the basement of the Earl Chapman home. Earl Chapman, the 
father of Kim Chapman, lived in the main portion of the house 
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with his wife. Beverly would stay in the Chapman house at night 
and return to her home in the day (T. 942-945). 
Beverly invited Defendant to come over to the Chapman 
apartment and visit her. She informed him that a spare key was 
kept under the steps to the Chapman home (R. 1354) . 
On the night of the shooting, Defendant had been out 
for some time and was cold and wet and wanted to get out of the 
weather and wanted desperately to talk with Beverly. He took the 
key which she had told him about from under the steps and opened 
the door into the Chapman basement (R. 1382-1384). 
Defendant testified that it was about 10:00 p.m. when 
he arrived in the basement and that he began sitting there 
thinking that it was a "dumb idea" to be there; that he started 
walking to the door to leave when he remembered his gloves, which 
were lying on the couch. Just as he was proceeding to retrieve 
them, he heard the upstairs door open, and the kids, Beverly, and 
Kim Chapman walked through the door upstairs (R. 1387) . 
Defendant then hid in a closet waiting for Chapman and 
Beverly to go to bed. He explained that he had no gun with him 
(R. 1389). Chapman and Beverly turned the television on. The 
Defendant opened the door of the closet to leave, but at that 
point saw Beverly and Chapman engaged in oral sex (R. 1393-94) . 
After hearing nothing for several minutes, he again 
attempted to sneak out of the apartment. Defendant's automatic 
alarm went off on his watch, and Chapman turned around and looked 
at him (R. 1397). Chapman reached for a fireplace tool, at which 
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point Defendant pulled out a knife from its sheath and put it in 
his hand. Beverly came toward the bathroom and spoke to him 
saying, "Bob, what the hell are you doing here? Are you crazy?" 
Defendant told her to shut up and walk over and sit down. He 
told Chapman to leave, but Chapman said he wasn°t going to and 
that he would stay with Beverly (T. 1399-1400). 
Defendant testified that he then confronted Beverly 
about a rape incident, and that she admitted to Chapman that it 
did not actually happen. 
Chapman became really angry and told Beverly to get her 
stuff and her kids out of the house the next morning and out of 
his life (R. 1406-1410). 
Defendant recalled that at this point he wanted to 
leave the room and started walking toward the outside entrance 
door. He got over to the door and then felt something shoved in 
his back. Chapman began telling Defendant that he was going to 
kill him because he had ruined Chapman's life (R. 1409-1410). 
Defendant did not know where Chapman got the gun. 
Defendant stated that while he was pleading with Chapman not to 
shoot him, Beverly was urging Chapman to kill him (T. 1412). He 
stated that he became worried that Chapman would pull the trigger 
and tried to knock the gun away from him (R. 1413). He stated 
that Beverly swung something at him and hit him on the back and 
that he kept on ducking to try to move away. He testified that 
the gun went off and exploded as they were fighting . Two more 
shots went off, and the next thing he remembered, Beverly was 
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sitting on the living room floor leaning on the poker. The gun 
was next to Chapman's leg on the floor (R. 1414). The next thing 
the Defendant remembers, he was running out of the house. 
Earl Chapman testified and verified that the key found 
on Defendant that night was normally hidden under the steps (R. 
613-614) . 
A gun was admitted into evidence as Exhibit 20 at the 
first trial which was represented to be the one that killed 
Chapman and wounded Beverly Jones (R. 793). The gun was a .38 
caliber pistol (hereinafter referred to as Exhibit 20). 
Witnesses testified that the gun admitted into evidence was 
similar to a gun owned by Defendant and to another gun owned by 
Beverly Jones (R. 1058, 1133). Defense counsel objected to the 
admission of the gun which was admitted into evidence at the 
trial, because the State failed to link it to the Defendant (R. 
787 and 793). The gun entered into evidence was neither 
Defendant's nor Beverly's gun. Caine was led to believe by the 
State that it was Beverly's gun. Officer Norman Soakai, a 
detective for the Ogden City Police Department, testified that he 
obtained Exhibit 20 on July 26 from a pawn shop called "The Gift 
House" in Ogden. He stated he was unable to link the Defendant, 
Robert Jones, to that gun (R. 825). 
The State called James Gaskill, Director of the Weber 
State College Crime Lab, as a ballistics expert. He testified 
that, in his opinion, Exhibit 20 was the gun which was used to 
shoot both Kim Chapman and Beverly Jones (R. 749). 
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Beverly Jones testified that when she first saw Jones 
in the basement, he had a black snub-nosed gun in his hand. (R. 
834.)• Beverly stated she did not know what kind of pistol it 
was, although it looked like a .38 caliber pistol. She said it 
looked like Exhibit 20 and that Defendant had a couple of guns of 
this type. (R. 873.) Beverly acknowledged that she had been 
given a .38 caliber gun by Defendant and she had taken it on one 
occasion elk hunting. She agreed that she had shown it to a 
fellow employee at Mervyn's but did not acknowledge that it was 
hers. (R. 875-876.) She denied that she ever owned a .38 
caliber gun or that she had the gun in the Chapman house in March 
of 1983. (R. 878.) Beverly Jones testified that 
after the elk hunt in September 1982, the gun she had been given 
was placed by Defendant Jones in a closet in her house in 
approximately November 1982 (R. 879). 
Beverly was shown Exhibit 20, but stated that she did 
not believe it was the gun she had been given before. She also 
testified that she is not sure whether that was the gun she had 
at the elk hunt, because they all looked the same to her. (R. 
970.) 
She stated that the night of the shooting , the gun was 
pointed at Kim by the Defendant and that when Kim and Defendant 
got to the door, Kim grabbed Defendant's wrists. It was at this 
point that the shots went off. She stated that Jones had not 
fired the gun until Kim Chapman grabbed his wrists. (R. 984, 
985.) Neither shot which hit her made her immobile, and she was 
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able to move around in the basement after Defendant left. (R. 
990-991.) She stated that she did not see any gun on the floor 
after Defendant left (R. 989). 
Eileen Johnston was called and stated that she was a 
neighbor of the Jones family and had seen Beverly Jones wearing a 
hand gun on her hip (in approximately September 1982). She 
stated that the size, shape and coloring of the handle of Exhibit 
20 looked very similar to the one holstered by Beverly Jones. 
(R. 1021-1024.) 
Doris Kennedy, the sister of Defendant Bob Jones, 
testified that she saw Beverly wearing a .38 caliber gun and 
asked her about it, at which time Beverly replied that Bob had 
bought it for her. Exhibit 20, according to Ms. Kennedy, looked 
very much like Beverly's gun, because the handle was similar and 
it had a unique wood grain. She further stated that Beverly told 
her after she had moved into Chapman's basement in February 1983 
that she had a gun with her and would use it if she had to to 
protect herself from Bob. (R. 1059-1062.) 
Bobbie Jones, the mother of Defendant, testified that 
her son bought Beverly a gun and that Beverly wore it for three 
or four days around the neighborhood so she could get used to 
carrying it. She stated that Exhibit 20 looked like the gun that 
Bob had bought for her but did not know for sure. She stated 
that when Bob moved back into the family house in November (1982) 
(prior to the shooting), Mrs. Jones took Bob's pistol and told 
him he could not have it. She stated that Bob did not have 
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access to the gun and that the gun was taken to her daughter 
Doris0 house and locked up. She further stated that she never 
saw Beverly's gun after Beverly moved into the Chapman residence. 
(R. 1109-1111.) Mrs. Jones had taken all of the guns out of her 
house shortly before Christmas because her son was having 
problems and she did not want him to have access to any gun. (R. 
1125.) She stated that there were two identical .38 caliber 
pistols owned by Bob and Beverly. As to Bob's gun, she kept it 
from him. (R. 1110.) 
Robert Jones, Sr ., the father of Defendant, testified 
that Exhibit 20 is identical to the two guns o^ned one by Beverly 
and the other by his son. (R. 1152.) He stated that the .38 
caliber was purchased for Beverly because she said she had to 
have a gun when she went hunting, because she was frightened of 
snakes. Bob's .38 caliber was taken away from him in December 
(1982) prior to the shooting and was kept at Bob's sister's 
house. He did not have access to the gun after that time. (R. 
1154-1155.) 
Defendant Robert Jones testified that he purchased a 
.38 caliber revolver for elk hunting season and a short time 
later bought an identical gun for Beverly. (R. 1293.) He stated 
that he believed Exhibit 20 was the gun he had purchased for 
Beverly. 
Defendant testified that while they were living 
together, both .38 caliber pistols remained in the household. 
(R. 1313.) Later, when he was evicted by Beverly (November 
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1982)/ he removed his own .38 caliber gun and took it to an 
apartment he was renting (R. 1350, 1351.) 
Defendant testified bhat on two separate occasions, Kim 
Chapman confronted him with a gun which looked very much like the 
.38 caliber gun he had purchased for Beverly. (R. 1352.) 
Jones testified that he did not have a gun when he 
entered the Chapman residence. It was only upon his attempt to 
leave that Kim Chapman shoved a gun in his back. He stated he 
did not know which gun Kim had in his hand, but it could have 
been Exhibit 20. (R. 1389, 1409-1412.) 
On cross-examination, Defendant stated he had no idea 
where Kim got the gun. He stated that the last time he saw it, 
it was lying by Kim's leg on the floor (R. 1457). 
Earl Chapman, Kim Chapman's father, on redirect, stated 
that when he went downstairs he did not see a gun or knife 
anywhere. (R. 1501.) He admitted that he never made a thorough 
search for the gun because he was concerned about his son and 
Beverly. (R. 1502.) 
In addition to this testimony concerning the guns, 
there were also references to the guns made by both attorneys in 
closing argument. Mr. Caine, Defendant's attorney, argued 
mistakenly that the gun used in the shooting was Beverly Jones' 
gun (because that's what the State had allowed him to believe) 
(R. 1673). Even Prosecutor Hughes agreed that there is no 
evidence to connect the gun used in the shooting to the Defendant 
(R. 1593). 
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SUMMARY OF PERTINENT TESTIMONY FROM 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING HELD JANUARY 6, 1986 
Prior to submission of briefs during Defendant's first 
appeal, the case was remanded to the Second Judicial District 
Court for an evidentiary hearing before the Honorable Ronald 0. 
Hyde on January 6, 1986. The following individuals testified: 
John Caine and Maurice Richards, Defendant°s attorneys at his 
first trial; Donald Hughes, the prosecuting County Attorney; 
Norman Soakai, an Ogden police officer investigating the crime; 
and Terry Carpenter, a South Ogden police officer associated with 
the investigation• 
John Caine stated that his detense at trial was that 
the murder weapon which was admitted was the gun given by 
Defendant to Beverly and was not the twin to that gun kept by Mr, 
Jones. Throughout the trial he stated he believed that the 
murder weapon was one of the two weapons purchased by Jones. He 
stated that the County Attorney never told him he was mistaken in 
that belief. (R. 1673.) 
Exhibit 1, which is Officer Soakai1s police report, was 
admitted. It was typed on August 29, 1983 - the same day the 
trial began (Addendum, Exhibit 1, hereafter referred to as 
Exhibit 1). Caine stated he was not informed that this report 
existed when he began the Jones trial (R. 1675). The report 
states that Norwood Fridal and Reynold Hasbie, who were armed 
robbers, had had possession of the gun which ballistics tests 
proved was also the murder weapon (R. 1677) . 
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Caine also testified that he was never informed by the 
police that Fridal and Hastie did not know Robert Jones, and did 
not assist him in any way (R. 1677-1678). Caine further stated 
that he was not aware, as Soakai1s report states, that another 
individual, Chris Singleton, had identified the gun as the murder 
weapon, even before the ballistics test had been performed (R. 
1680). He acknowledged that it would have been important for him 
as a defense lawyer to investigate how Chris Singleton might have 
known this was the murder weapon (R. 1682-1683). He said he 
would have considered it a significant fact that there was a 
witness that somehow knew this was a murder weapon even before 
the ballistics test proved such. Neither Officer Soakai nor the 
prosecutor told him there was such a witness (R. 1680). 
Caine stated that he knew Officer Soakai had gotten the 
gun from the pawn shop but did not know exactly how he got it. 
Caine did not cross-examine Soakai in Defendant's first trial, 
but stated that he would have considered cross-examining Soakai 
about the information contained in Exhibit 1 had he known that 
the report existed (R. 1682-1683). He acknowledged that he knew 
of part of Mr. Soakai's investigation but did not know the full 
extent of it and was not operating at the time of trial with full 
knowledge of all of the facts (R. 1683). In his opinion, the 
testimony concerning the chain of custody of the gun would have 
corroborated the story told by the Defendant; i.e., that the gun 
was already in someone else's possession when the Defendant 
entered the home. (The defense was attempting to show that 
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Beverly Jones had the gun while the State was discounting that 
assertion.) (R. 1684.) 
Came also stated that he did not know that a Mr. 
Blarney was the original purchaser of the weapon and that a Mr. 
McDill is the one who pawned it. He stated that had he known 
this it would have been useful in investigating who was involved 
with the gun and checking to see if any of those people had a 
connection with Beverly. There would be an issue as to whether 
any of these people knew each other in order to connect the 
murder weapon to Beverly. (R. 1704-1705.) 
Caine agreed that if he could have shown' a connection 
between Beverly Jones and Chris Singleton, a connection alleged 
to exist by Defendant's family, such fact would have been 
powerful evidence in support of Defendant's position. (R. 1717.) 
Maurice Richards testified that he spoke with Mr. 
Hastie, who denied any possibility that he had been connected 
with the shooting (R. 1726). Richards further stated that 
Officer Soakai never revealed to him that his investigation 
showed that Fridal and Hastie had had possession of the weapon. 
The only thing the police told him was that Chris Singleton had 
pawned the gun or had done something with it, which led him to 
talk to Hastie (R. 1728). 
Richards also agreed that it would have been important 
to their case to show that the registered owner of the gun was 
someone totally unconnected with Robert Jones (R. 1730). 
Donald Hughes, the prosecuting attorney for the State, 
-20-
testified that he had no specific recollection of ever having 
talked to Officer Soakai about Chris Singleton's statement that 
the gun had been used in several armed robberies and was the same 
gun that killed Kim Chapman. He stated that he had no 
recollection of Soakai's report at trial (R. 1746-1748). 
Contradicting himself, he said that defense counsel had full 
information concerning the report, because he had discussed it 
with them (R. 1748). He related that he was aware that the 
murder weapon had been traced to William Harvey Blarney and that 
he knew the original purchaser was not Robert Jones. He did not 
recall telling the defense lawyers that he had positively 
identified the registered owner of the weapon and that it was not 
the Defendant (R. 1750-1751.) 
Officer Norman Soakai contradicted several of Mr. 
Hughes1 statements. He stated that he had told Don Hughes 
everything that was in the report before he prepared it, and that 
Don Hughes took notes while he explained his report. He told 
Hughes about talking to Chris Singleton, to Fridal and to Hastie. 
(R. 1805). Two weeks before the trial began, he was told by 
Hughes to prepare the report so he could give a copy of it to 
Caine and Richards. The day before the trial, Soakai went down 
to get a copy of the report. He picked up the copy personally on 
the day of trial, because Hughes said he needed a copy. He 
delivered a copy to Hughes at the courtroom (R. 1809). He was 
not asked to give the report to the defense attorneys; rather, 
Hughes said he would do it himself (R. 1808) . 
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Soakai stated that he had been instructed as a 
detective not to go out and voluntarily talk to defense lawyers. 
He does not ever recall talking to the defense attorneys about 
the report. (R. 1820-1821). 
Soakai further testified that he believed the evidence 
he obtained as to the chain of custody of the murder weapon was 
very, very important. (R. 1806A.) He attempted to connect 
either Chris Singleton or Hastie or Fridal to Robert Jones on 
many occasions/ but was unable to make that connection (R. 1803.) 
SUMMARY OF SECOND TRIAL 
1. Testimony Relating to .38 Caliber Weapon 
Although the information stated above was available to 
Attorney Fletcher, none of it was utilized on behalf of Defendant 
in his second trial. The second trial was devoid of any 
reference to the weapon used in the Chapman shooting . 
Roger Birt testified that in December 1982 he had 
purchased a revolver with money given to him by the Defendant and 
then gave the gun to the Defendant. He testified further that 
when he and the Defendant took the gun out to fire it, it was 
somewhat different, in that the serial number had been filed off 
(R. 2484-2488) . 
Beverly Jones testified that, while she and Kim Chapman 
were watching television, she turned and saw the Defendant 
standing in the hallway (R. 2523) and that the Defendant had a 
-22-
gun in his hand (R. 2526). She stated that the Defendant and 
Chapman were talking back and forth when the gun went off (R. 
2531), She, herself, was shot In the hand and the back (R. 2532, 
2533) , but she was able to pull herself up (R. 2533) . 
Earl Chapman and Eva Chapman, residents of the home in 
which the incidents occurred, testified, as well as Officers Rudy 
Van Beekum and Gail Bowcutt of the Ogden City Police Department, 
who participated in the investigation of the incident. All 
testified that they saw no weapon in the basement after the 
incident had occurred (R. 2258, 2278, 2293, 2322, 2323) . 
Though Officer Norman Soakai testified during 
Defendant's second trial, he was cross-examined only 
superficially and not questioned in any manner about the issues 
discussed above regarding the chain of custody of the gun 
involved in the Chapman shooting (Soakai's entire testimony, R. 
2382-2393) . 
James Gaskill, the ballistics expert, testified that 
all the bullets found at the scene were fired from the same gun 
(R. 2450). Mr. Gaskill was not cross-examined regarding the 
identity of the gun that fired the bullets, even though in the 
first trial, as noted above, he testified that the gun admitted 
into evidence, Exhibit 20, was the gun that fired the bullets 
which were determined to have killed Chapman (R. 749). Gaskill 
was also not questioned in a way to clarify that the gun Birt 
testified about was not the same gun which fired the bullets 
which killed Chapman (R. 2921, 2442-2470). 
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In addition to this testimony, or lack of it, 
pertaining to the gun used in the Chapman shooting, there were 
references made at Defendant's sentencing hearing by the State's 
attorney, David Schwendiman, to supposed facts not in evidence. 
Mr. Schwendiman stated the following: 
"... There was preparation. A gun was purchased. A 
gun was brought to the residence there, was loaded. He 
waited with the gun that night." (R. 2746.) 
2. Other Facts from Second Trial 
Apparently, Ms. Fletcher was well aware that the 
Defendant was not happy with the defense she was presenting of 
his case. In an in-chambers conference with the judge and the 
parties' attorneys, the following statements were made: 
"The Court: You want your client here for some of 
this? 
Ms. Fletcher: I don°t think it is necessary. We are 
going to maybe have a big explosion 
today. 
The Court: Big explosion? 
Ms. Fletcher: Maybe. We have been told— 
The Court: Tell me what that is. 
Mr. Parrish: Does that mean I need to sit somewhere 
else? 
Ms. Fletcher: I don't mean like necessarily violence, 
but perhaps the acting out, and I get 
fired and all of that stuff. We will 
get to it if we have to. We are doing 
the best we can on that." (R. 2564.) 
HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
On Ju ly 19, 1988, a hear ing was held on Defendant ' s 
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Motion for New Trial, The evidence at that hearing was presented 
in the form of Defendant's attorney reading pertinent portions of 
prior transcripts into the record and in the admission into 
evidence of documents as exhibits. Both the defense and the 
State attempted to subpoena Ginger Fletcher for this hearing, but 
she was unavailable (R. 2879) . The pertinent information from 
the hearing on Defendant's Motion for New Trial as it pertains to 
Defendant's current appeal is summarized as follows: 
1. Evidence of Defendant's Mental Deficiencies 
Statements were made to the Court that Defendant's 
mental condition was a crucial issue that was not raised at 
trial. Though Defendant's sentencing hearing focused on this 
issue, the Court would not consider it at that time because it 
had not been raised at trial (R. 2751, 2880) . 
2. Evidence Regarding Theme of Case 
(Chain of Custody of Gun) 
During Defendant's second trial, as previously 
discussed/ Roger Birt testified that he had purchased a revolver 
for Defendant and that he and the Defendant went to test fire the 
gun. When they were firing the gunr Mr. Birt noticed that the 
serial number had been filed off (R. 2484-2488/ 2883) . 
Exhibit 1* was admitted/ which was a report from the 
prosecutor's investigator/ Victor M. Gabrenas (R. 2883). This 
report states that shortly after Defendant's first trial, Jones 
had directed his attorney/ Caine# to an area of Ogden's upper 
bench where a .38 caliber revolver was found in some rocks with 
the serial number filed off. When ballistic tests were done of 
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this weapon, it was determined that it was not the murder weapon 
(R. 2884, Addendum, Exhibit 2). Though Mr, Gabrenas testified in 
Defendant's second trial (R. 2397-2402), he was not cross-
examined regarding this report, nor was he asked to explain that 
the gun Mr. Birt had described in his testimony which had the 
serial number filed off was not the same gun used in the Chapman 
shooting • 
The police report written by Officer Norm Soakai 
(previously discussed above), was admitted .as Exhibit 2* (R. 
1886). This report contained information from Chris Singleton 
regarding the fact that the gun used in some armed robberies was 
the same gun used in the Chapman shooting (R, 2888, 2889, 
Addendum, Exhibit 1). The contents of the report were further 
discussed in this hearing. This report states that the 
registered owner of the alleged murder weapon is a Mr. Harvey 
Blarney, who stated that he bought that gun from the Gift House, a 
pawn shop in Ogden, and on the date of purchase he gave the gun 
to Reynold Hastie. Hastie was one of the armed robbers involved 
in some robberies which took place both before and after the 
Chapman shooting. According to Chris Singleton, the gun used in 
those robberies is the same gun used in the Chapman shooting (R. 
2886, 2887, 2891, and Addendum, Exhibits 1, 4, 5, and 12). 
Exhibits 3* and 4*, written statements given by Norwood 
Fridal, were admitted (R. 2890). Fridal states that he and 
Reynold Hastie were involved in armed robberies using a .38 
caliber weapon, which robberies occurred on March 4, 1983, and 
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again on March 16, 1983 (Addendum, Exhibits 4 and 5) (the 
shooting in this case occurred March 11, 1983) . 
Exhibit 5*, a statement by Mr. Fridal that he didn't 
know Defendant Robert Jones until they met in prison sometime in 
September 1983, after Defendant's first trial, was admitted (R. 
2896, 2897). Fridal disavows that anyone but he and his 
accomplice, Reynold Hastie, were involved in this crime spree; 
i.e., the robberies described above (Addendum, Exhibit 6). 
The statement from the January 6, 1986, hearing, of 
Officer Terry Carpenter of the South Ogden Police Department was 
read (R. 2893, 2894). Carpenter testified that Reynold Hastie 
and Chris Singleton were related in some way and had spent some 
time together (R. 1835) . He further stated that Chris Singleton 
also told him where the weapon was and, in fact, she admitted 
that the gun may have been used in some armed robberies. She 
further stated that Mike McDiLl had the gun (R. 1836, 2893). 
Exhibit 8* was admitted, which is a pawn slip, pawning 
a .38 special, serial number P139058, by Michael McDill (R. 2901 
and Addendum, Exhibit 7). Exhibit 7* was admitted, which was an 
Affidavit for Search Warrant, which was executed by Officer 
Soakai to obtain the .38 caliber handgun, serial number P139058, 
from the pawn shop after it had been pawned by Michael McDill (R. 
2893, 2901, and Addendum, Exhibit 8). Exhibit 6* was also 
admitted, which was an Affidavit taken of Michael McDill in which 
he admitted that he did pawn the gun after having been given it 
by Chris Singleton (R. 2897, 2901 and Addendum, Exhibit 9). The 
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Court was reminded that Officer Soakai was not cross-examined 
during the Defendant's second trial regarding the possession of 
the gun nor related issues described above (R, 2386-2393, 2921). 
Don Hughes' testimony at the evidentiary hearing of 
January 6, 1986, was read, wherein he stated that his office 
and/or the police had tried to connect the various persons 
involved in the allegations contained herein. Mr. Hughes 
testified as follows: 
"I know that Hastie and Fridal were co-conspirators. 
Chris Singleton, I think is Hastie's cousin. They had 
been involved in a lot of drug deals together. I 
suspect she was also involved in one of the armed 
robberies. I think one of the car descriptions would 
fit her car." 
(R. 1759, 1760, 2895.) 
Officer Soakai's testimony at the evidentiary hearing 
was read in which he stated that he had tried many, many times to 
connect either Chris Singleton or Hastie or Fridal to the 
Defendant, Robert Jones, but that he had been unable to make that 
connection (R. 1802, 1803, 2896). 
More of Officer Carpenter's prior testimony was read, 
in which he stated that a woman by the name of Audrey Nordall was 
somehow connected to one of the armed robbers (R. 1844, 1845, 
2893, 2894) . 
Evidence was proferred that Chris Norvall aka Audrey 
Nordall is Defendant's ex-wife and has custody of his children. 
That, in fact, Norvall and Beverly Jones had a social 
relationship and, further, that Norvall would use Defendant's 
children against him in ways such as allowing Beverly Jones to 
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have custody of them for a day or an evening while Beverly Jones 
still lived next door to the Defendant, Robert Jones (R. 2894). 
During the first trial, Norvall testified that she had talked to 
Beverly (R. 1481, 2895). She did not testify at Defendant's 
second trial. 
3. Evidence of Poor Cross-Examination 
Gary Gibbs1 testimony from Defendant's second trial was 
read. Gibbs testified that Defendant had offered him money to 
help him kill Kim Chapman (R. 2438). This type of statement was 
also contained in Soakai's poLice report (Addendum, Exhibit 1). 
Exhibit 10*, an Affidavit signed by Gibbs, the procurement of 
which was requested by Ginger Fletcher (R. 2915) was then 
admitted (R. 2913) . Gibbs states that it is a falsehood that he 
told Detective Soakai that Robert Jones had told him or asked to 
help him kill Kim Chapman, referring to Soakai°s police report 
(Addendum, Exhibit 10). Defendant's attorney, Ginger Fletcher, 
did not cross-examine Gibbs (R. 2439-2441) nor Officer Norm 
Soakai (R. 2386-2392) regarding this obvious inconsistency. 
4. Miscellaneous Issues Addressed at Defendant's Hearing 
on Motion for New Trial 
Statements were proffered by defense counsel, setting 
forth a summary of what the Defendant's testimony would have been 
on several issues as follows: 
1. That previous defense counsel, Ginger Fletcher, 
failed to consult with Defendant on certain important 
decisions; e.g., theory of the case. 
2. That 23 witnesses were subpoenaed, but only 
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three were actually called during the trial. 
3. Mr. Jones would testify that in urging her to 
defend on the theory of the case which had been agreed 
to and which they had discussed/ she indicated to him 
that all of that would be brought out on rebuttal (R. 
2877) . 
*These Exhibits/ though available to Attorney Fletcher, were not 
presented during Defendant's second trial. 
FACTS RELATING TO DEFENDANT'S COMPETENCY/MENTAL ILLNESS 
Prior to Defendant's first trial and after an 
evaluation which took place at the State Hospital/ a hearing was 
held May 10/ 1983/ in which Defendant was found to be incompetent 
to stand trial and was remanded to the custody of the Utah State 
Hospital (R. 47-54). On June 13/ 19R3, another hearing was held/ 
at which Defendant was found competent to stand trial (R. 55). 
At the first trial/ members of his family testified that after 
the Defendant got out of his military service, he seemed to have 
changed. He was like two different people. His sister, Doris 
Kennedy, testified that one minute he is one person and the next 
he is someone else, and the someone else isn't a very nice 
person. He's ornery and irrational (R. 1035-1037). She further 
testified that when Defendant changed/ his physical 
characteristics would also change/ including his voice and facial 
appearance (R. 1040) . 
Defendant's father, Robert Jones, Sr ., testified that 
when Defendant was in the military, the chaplain called him and 
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said that he felt his son was mentally ill and he should try to 
get him out of the service (R. 1149). He further testified that 
when his brother, Denny, died in 1967, Defendant was devastated, 
and that the Defendant had been in and out of mental institutions 
eight to ten times during the last eight years (R. 1151) . 
Bobbie Jones, Defendant's mother, testified that while 
he was in the Army he was put in a mental hospital in Colorado 
after he went AWOL (R. 1102) . She further testified that 
Defendant had been in other mental hospitals, and that he had 
been working with the mental health department for over eight 
years (R. 1103) . She -further testified that generally he is a 
sweet, beautiful person that you love to be around, but that he 
seemed to turn into a second person (R. 1105 and 1106) . 
The other victim in this shooting, Beverly Jones, 
testified in the preliminary hearing prior to the first trial 
that while in the Chapman residence, she thought the Defendant 
was crazy and "looked like he was high on something. He wasn°t 
the same Robert...it was just a different, whole different 
personality, like a really rotten mean person" (R. 39). She 
further stated that, having known him for quite awhile, that at 
times he was pretty rational and decent, and that at other times 
he was not, and that on that night his eyes appeared to be glazed 
over (R. 40). She testified similarly in Defendant's first trial 
as well (R. 993, 994). 
Nathan Joseph Webster, who was a police officer 
assisting in the arrest of the Defendant, described him in the 
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first trial as being incoherent and agreed that Defendant's "eyes 
were glazed, appeared to be somebody that if you didn°t know 
anything else about him that he would either be heavily 
intoxicated or medicated or been through some harrowing 
experience." (R. 722, 723.) In Defendant's second trial 
sentencing hearing, Officer Webster testified that when he first 
saw Defendant he had a glazed or dazed look (R. 2723). 
Though, as indicated above, Defendant had a long 
history of mental problems, the issue of mental competency was 
not raised during his second trial. However, during the 
sentencing phase of the second trial, Dr. Alma Carlisle, the head 
of the psychology department at the Utah State Prison, testified 
regarding the mental problems suffered by Defendant. 
Dr. Carlisle testified that Defendant suffered from two 
distinct mental illnesses/disorders. One is a multiple 
personality disorder (R. 2688 and 2715, see also 2686). It was 
also Dr. Carlisle°s opinion that the Defendant suffers from 
another mental illness called bi-polar disorder or manic-
depressive (R. 2692-2693 and 2686) . 
A stipulation was entered into between Defendant and 
the state in which it was agreed that Dr. Van Austin, a 
psychiatrist, would testify, had he been present at the hearing, 
that Defendant is suffering from manic-depression and is taking 
lithium for treatment of such (R. 2726). 
Dr. Carlisle testified that it's possible that 
suffering from manic-depression or bi-polar disorder might commit 
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a crime wherein his behavior is a product of the mental illness 
(R. 2716) and, further, that, in regard to the multiple 
personality illness, one suffering from such is not totally in 
control as one whole person is (R. 2699, 2675, 2676, 2677) . 
Dr• Carlisle also testified that a normal person's 
thought processes would be consistent in committing a crime from 
beginning to end, and that there "seems to be more responsibility 
for that [type of] individual than for a multiple, who is, to a 
degree, out of control" (R. 2718). 
After the evidence was presented to the Court at 
Defendant's sentencing hearing September 1, 1987, before the 
Honorable David E. Roth, the Court stated the following: 
"This is a sentencing hearing, and I'm not here to 
determine whether the Defendant had a disorder that 
would, or an illness that would, excuse his conduct or 
the offense. Obviously, those issues, if they were 
going to be raised, would have been raised at trial. 
THEY WERE NOT." [Emphasis added.] 
(R. 2750-2751.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that Attorney Ginger Fletcher was 
ineffective in her representation. That her deficiencies lead to 
his conviction on serious charges when there was, in fact, 
evidence that, if presented, could have resulted in Defendant's 
acquittal or at least a conviction on a lesser charge. 
ARGUMENT 
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
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States states in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right...to have compulsory process for 
obtaining witnesses in his favor and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defense." 
The standard of review applied to cases where the 
assistance of prior counsel is challenged has been established by 
the United States Supreme Court. The Court has stated, "To 
succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel requires 
a showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was 
not functioning as the 'counsel1 guaranteed the Defendant by the 
Sixth Amendment and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668/ reh'g denied, 
467 U.S. 1267 (1984), 80 L.Ed.2d 674; see also State v. 
Morehouse, 748 P.2d 219 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); State v. Frame, 723 
P.2d 401 (Utah, 1986). And further, in order to show prejudice 
to his case, defendant must show that there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine the 
confidence of the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 649, see also 
Morehouse, 748 P.2d at 219; State v. Archuleta, 747 P.2d 1019, 
1023 (Utah, 1987); State v. Wynia, 82 Utah Adv. Rep. 16. 
Defendant claims the following deficiencies: 
1. Counsel Ginger Fletcher did not bring to light in 
any manner Defendant's mental illness/disorders, even though 
ample evidence was available regarding a long history of mental 
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illness suffered by Defendant, 
2. Counsel did not pursue the obvious theme of the 
case, even after having agreed to do so. 
3. Counsel failed to consult with Defendant on key 
issues, and even misled Defendant, telling him that the issues he 
was concerned about would be brought out in rebuttal. They were 
not. 
4. Counsel misled Defendant by having 23 witnesses 
subpoenaed, but calling only three to testify. 
5. Counsel failed to adequately cross-examine certain 
key witnesses. 
Each area of deficiency will be addressed as a separate 
subsection. 
Point One: 
Failure to Present Evidence of Defendant's Suffering of 
Mental Illness/Deficiency 
As noted above, several witnesses testified in 
Defendants first trial regarding the history of his mental 
condition. They described that at one point in time Defendant 
would be a nice person, but then he would switch and become an 
ornery and irrational person. His history in and out of mental 
hospitals and treatment programs was also outlined fully, as set 
forth above (pp. 30-31, supra). 
Dr. Alma Carlisle, the head psychologist at the Utah 
State Prison, testified in Defendant's sentencing hearing (second 
trial) about the mental illnesses suffered by Defendant, calling 
one a multiple personality disorder and the other a bi-polar 
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disorder, or manic-depressive illness. Dr. Carlisle also 
testified that one suffering from multiple personality disorder 
is not totally in control as one whole person is, and further 
that there seems to be more responsibility for an individual who 
would have consistent thought processes than for a multiple who, 
to a degree, is out of control (pp. 31-32, supra). 
These and additional facts discussed above raise the 
issue of whether or not the Defendant had the capacity to form 
the intent required by statute to commit the crimes he was 
charged with. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-101, et seq.; 76-2-305. The 
issue of competency to stand trial and the effect of Defendant's 
mental illnesses in relation to his alleged actions should have 
been addressed prior and/or during Defendant's second trial. 
Utah Code Ann. §77-14-3. The lower court refused to address this 
issue at Defendant's sentencing hearing after prior counsel 
withdrew (R. 2750-2751) . 
Point Two: 
Failure to Pursue the Obvious Theme 
of the Case Even After Agreement to Do So 
(Chain of Custody of the Gun) 
In order for Defendant to be found guilty of Murder in 
the First Degree, it must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt 
that he intentionally or knowingly caused the death of another 
under certain circumstances. Utah Code Ann. §76-5-202. There 
are two circumstances of 17 listed in the statute which arguably 
apply as follows: 
(1)(c). The actor knowingly created a great risk 
of death to a person other than the victim and the 
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actor. 
(l)(d). The homicide was committed while the actor 
was engaged in the commission or in an attempt to 
commit or flight after committing or attempting to 
commit...Aggravated Burglary, Burglary..., Utah Code 
Ann. §76-5-202(1)(c), (d). 
There is no doubt that Kim Chapman was killed by 
bullets fired from a gun during a confrontation with the 
Defendant. The question is, did the Defendant commit a criminal 
act, and if so, what level of crime was committed. There are 
numerous possibilities as follows: 
1. He is guilty of the charges he was convicted 
of. 
2. He is guilty only of Murder in the Second 
Degree if it were shown that a prerequisite for Murder 
in the First Degree did not exist (Utah Code Ann. §76-
5-203). 
3. He is guilty only of Manslaughter if it were 
shown that the Defendant was suffering under an extreme 
emotional disturbance (Utah Code Ann, §76-5-205). 
4. He is Not Guilty by reason that Defendant's 
actions amounted to nothing more than an accident or 
self defense. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-402. 
5. He is Not Guilty due to his diminished mental 
capacity. Utah Code Ann. §76-2-305. 
The alternative possibilities to Defendant's conviction 
of Murder in the First Degree are viable if one of two things is 
shown: 
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1. The Defendant's intent or knowledge is lacking 
to the degree necessary for such conviction, and/or it 
is shown that he acted under the influence of extreme 
emotional disturbance, for which there is a reasonable 
explanation or excuse. Utah Code Ann, §76-5-205; or 
2. It is shown that the Defendant did not enter 
the Chapman residence while engaged in the commission 
of an Aggravated Burglary or Burglary. 
Defendant was invited to the Chapman house by Beverly 
Jones and told about the location of the key which he could and, 
in fact, did use to let himself into the home (R. 2354, 1382-
1384) . An obvious defense to the charge of Murder in the First 
Degree is that Defendant did not commit the Burglary or 
Aggravated Burglary required, but in fact had permission to enter 
the home or, at most, was simply trespassing. The elements of 
the crime of Burglary include unlawful entry or remaining in a 
building with intent to commit a felony, theft, or assault 
therein (Utah Code Ann. §76-2-202). Permission to enter the home 
would negate the element of unlawful entry and raise a 
substantial question regarding the Defendant's purpose for being 
in the home. 
The only other prerequisite to First Degree Murder 
which could possibly apply to this case is that the Defendant 
knowingly or intentionally created a great risk of death to a 
person other than the victim and actor. Utah Code Ann. 76-5-
202(1) (d) . 
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The issue of what gun was involved in the shooting of 
Chapman is crucial in addressing this element. If, in fact, 
Defendant took a gun into the house as the State alleges, the 
argument is much stronger that Defendant did have the knowledge 
and/or the intent required for the conviction. However, if 
Defendant was in the Chapman residence solely to talk to Beverly 
Jones, did not carry a gun into the home and, in fact, was to a 
degree himself a victim of circumstances, then the State cannot 
carry its burden and the Defendant cannot be convicted of First 
Degree Murder. In support of this obvious theory of Defendant's 
case is the discussion of the source of the weapon used in the 
shooting. 
As discussed above, the murder weapon identified by 
ballistics was clearly not a gun owned at any time, nor proved to 
have been possessed at any time, by the Defendant. There were 
actually four guns referred to at various times during this case. 
Two of them were purchased by Defendant, one of which he had kept 
and the other he had given to Beverly (pp. 13, 14 supra). A 
third gun was purchased by Roger Birt for the Defendant shortly 
before the Chapman shooting (pp. 22 and 25, supra). The evidence 
has always been that none of these three guns were involved in 
the Chapman shooting. Information relating to the fourth gun has 
never been presented to a jury on behalf of the Defendant. This 
fourth gun, which was the gun used in the Chapman shooting, was 
purchased by Harvey Blarney from The Gift House and given to 
Reynold Hastie, who, together with Norwood Fridal, used the gun 
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in several armed robberies, shortly before and shortly after the 
shooting in this case. The gun was subsequently given to Chris 
Singleton, who gave it to Mike McDill, who pawned it back to The 
Gift House. It was then retrieved by Officer Norm Soakai of the 
Ogden City Police Department by search warrant (pp. 17-21 and 25-
28, supra). It was subsequently determined by the ballistics 
expert that this fourth gun was the one that fired the bullets 
that killed Chapman (pp. 13 and 23, supra). 
"The questions of what gun was used, how the gun got 
into the Chapman basement, and who the aggressor really was 
should have been presented to the jury. Information 
distinguishing the four guns was accumulated by Defendant's first 
appellate attorneys, Max Wheeler and Craig Cook. Their briefs 
and other information they compiled were obviously available to 
Ms. Fletcher, in that much of it was public record (Transcript of 
Defendant°s evidentiary hearing held January 6, 1986 [R. 1665-
1847]; Defendant's Appellate Brief(s) dated August 5, 1986 
[Addendum, Exhibit 11]). 
Defendant provides a very plausible theory that the 
fourth gun was brought to the Chapman basement through Beverly 
Jones. That this gun was obtained by her from Audrey Nordall 
(aka Chris Norvall), Defendant's ex-wife, with whom Beverly was 
well-acquainted (p. 28, supra). It is believed by Defendant and 
his family that a link exists between Norvall and the armed 
robbers, Fridal and Hastie. This theory is also believed by 
Officer Carpenter (R. 1844). Defendant argues that Beverly Jones 
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requested help from Ms• Norvall in obtaining the weapon; that 
Norvall obtained the gun and loaned it to Beverly. 
After the shooting incident, Defendant argues that the 
gun was left on the floor; that Beverly Jones, who was still 
mobile, though wounded (R. 990, 991), was able to retrieve the 
weapon and hide it in a manner that it was not discovered. At 
the earliest opportunity, she enlisted the help of an accomplice, 
who retrieved the weapon from the Chapman basement and returned 
it to Norvall. Norvall then returned it to her connection with 
the armed robbers. Five days after the Chapman shooting, the gun 
was used in an armed robbery (p. 26, supra). 
Reviewing testimony from Defendant°s second trial, the 
only reference made to a gun was from the testimony of Roger 
Birt. Birt stated that he obtained a gun for the Defendant and 
they had gone out shooting together, and that when they went 
shooting, the serial number of the gun had been filed off. 
Investigator Gabrenas1 report (Addendum, Exhibit 2) indicates 
that this gun (with the serial number filed off) is clearly not 
the gun used in the Chapman shooting. 
Ballistics expert James Gaskill testified in 
Defendant's first trial that all the bullets that had been found 
had come from the same weapon, and he identified the gun which 
had fired the bullets as this fourth gun, Exhibit 20 (p. 13, 
supra). 
In Defendant's second trial, Gaskill's testimony 
included statements about the bullets. No mention of which gun 
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they were fired from was ever made. Defense counsel Fletcher 
made no effort to enlighten the jury that the weapon which Mr. 
Birt had testified about was not the gun used in the shooting, 
nor was the jury told that there even were other guns (see entire 
cross-examination of this witness, R. 2491-2492). 
Even the State admits that the issue of the chain of 
custody of the gun used in the shooting is a significant issue 
and would raise a doubt in the jurors1 minds. In the State's 
argument during Defendant's Motion for New Trial, State 
Prosecutor Robert Parrish made the following comment: 
"The State made a conscious choice not to try to 
introduce either weapon because of the doubts that had 
been raised at that time." (R. 2903). 
It is obvious that the State felt it very beneficial to 
its case to avoid discussion of the weapon in this case, and, in 
fact, the State's utilization of the witness Roger Birt appears 
to have been an attempt to mislead the jury to believe that the 
gun discussed by Mr. Birt was the same gun used in the Chapman 
shooting (R. 2481, et seq.). 
Point Three: 
Counsel Failed to Consult With Defendant 
on Key Issues and Misled Defendant, Indicating 
That the Issues He Was Concerned About Would Be 
Brought Out in Rebuttal 
Rule 1.4 of the Rules of Professional Conduct regarding 
communication between client and attorney states: "(a) a lawyer 
shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a 
matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests for 
information; (b) a lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent 
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reasonably necessary to enable the client to make informed 
decisions regarding the representation." Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration, Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.4 (1988). 
The Supreme Court has clearly set focth counsel's duty 
in this respect as one of loyalty to advocate the Defendant's 
cause, to consult with Defendant on important decisions, to keep 
him informed as to important developments, and to use skill and 
knowledge to render reliable adversarial testing. Str ickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688; 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 694. 
Defendant Jones filed a notarized Motion for Trial de 
Novo, pro se, in which he sets forth Counsel Fletcher's failures 
to keep him informed and to defend him as agreed. Defendant 
argues that counsel willfully and intentionally refused to 
confide in, discuss, or counsel Defendant as to counsel's defense 
strategy, and that he had made strong objections against the type 
of defense that was presented (R. 2148-2150). Counsel failed to 
keep Defendant informed as the law requires (R. 2164-2165, 2171, 
2174, 2176). 
Not only did counsel fail in her duties to consult with 
Defendant and keep him informed (R. 2170), she stated, in 
response to Defendant's request for a continuance, that she was 
"not being paid enough by Weber County to warrant a postponement, 
as it wouldn't be until September that we would be able to get 
another trial date." Also, that she "wasn't going to work on it 
all summer." (R. 2149 and 2924). Further, Defendant felt that 
counsel was more concerned about getting Defendant's trial over 
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with prior to the July 3rd holiday than with Defendant's fate (R. 
2151 and 2171). 
Defendant claims that counsel lied to him. She 
promised him that evidence would be presented to clarify that the 
gun discussed in trial was not the weapon used in the shooting. 
Apparently, such promises were made only to keep the 
Defendant calm, "so as not to offend the jury." (R. 2163.) 
Counsel made several statements to Defendant that the evidence he 
wanted to present would be brought out on rebuttal (R. 2151, 
2152, 2155, 2163, 2166, 2175, and 2877). No such evidence was 
ever presented. 
Counsel knew of her deficient performance, as she made 
the Court aware that Defendant was unhappy and might fire her 
prior to the end of the trial (R. 2564) . 
Point Four: 
Counsel Misled Defendant by Subpoenaeing 23 Witnesses 
and Calling Only 3 to Testify 
Trial counsel's failure to call witnesses to 
corroborate testimony is basis for establishing inefficiency of 
counsel. People v. Schiering, 92 Cal. App. 3d 429 and 154 Cal. 
Rep. 847. See also Jones v. Huff, 152 F.2d 14, Arrowood v. 
Clusen, 723 F.2d 1364 (1984). 
Defendant's statements in his written Motion for New 
Trial and proffered evidence during the hearing on Motion for New 
Trial were that Ms. Fletcher had agreed to and did subpoenae 23 
witnesses to testify on behalf of Defendant. Of those 
subpoenaed, counsel called only three (3) to testify, sending the 
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rest away without calling them (R. 2159, 2165, 2166, 2877, and 
2923). Many of those sent away were crucial to establish 
Defendant's theory of the case and to impeach some of the State's 
witnesses. 
Point Five: 
Counsel Failed to Adequately Cross-Examine 
Certain Key Witnesses 
Roger Birt 
Counsel's inadequate questioning of this witness 
(discussed supra, pp. 22, 25, 40-41). 
Gary Gibbs 
Mr. Gibbs testified that Defendant had offered him 
$5,000.00 to help him go kill Kim Chapman. 
During the hearing on Defendant's Motion for New Trial, 
as indicated above, an Affidavit of Mr. Gibbs was admitted (R. 
2915) which casts serious question on the credibility of the 
statements he made regarding his alleged conversations with the 
Defendant. Gibbs states that the information contained in 
Officer Soakai's report regarding his statement that the 
Defendant asked him to help kill Chapman "is a falsehood." 
Further, that Soakai had threatened Gibbs in order to get him to 
make his original statement (Addendum, Exhibit 10). 
Proffered testimony was admitted that Ms. Fletcher was 
the one who requested the obtaining of the Affidavit from Gibbs, 
and yet he was not cross-examined regarding the Affidavit (see 
entire cross-examination of Gibbs, R. 2439-2441). 
Beverly Jones 
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In comparing the transcripts of Defendant's first 
criminal proceedings in this matter with the transcripts of his 
second trial, it is evident that Ms. Fletcher failed to 
effectively cross-examine Beverly Jones, the State's only eye 
witness to the incidents involved herein. As noted above, in the 
first trial Beverly testified regarding Defendant's apparent 
mental condition, stating in the preliminary hearing of the 
proceedings that he "was crazy and looked like he was high on 
something. He wasn't the same Robert...it was just a different, 
whole different personality, like a really rotten, mean person" 
(R. 39). She further stated that, having known him for quite 
awhile, that at times he was pretty rational and decent and other 
times he was not. That on that night, his eyes appeared to be 
glazed over (R. 40; see also similar testimony from Defendant's 
first trial, R. 993 and 994.) 
No information was elicited from Beverly regarding 
these facts, which would have corroborated other evidence 
regarding Defendant's suffering from a mental illness. 
There was no reference made in the second trial as had 
been in the first that it appeared to her that Defendant was 
leaving the house when Kim Chapman grabbed Defendant's wrists, 
and it was only at that time that the gun discharged (R. 983, 
2150, and 2156). It is apparent that the information that should 
have been elicited would have been the basis for an argument that 
the shooting was nothing more than an accident or even self 
defense. 
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SUMMARY 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is demonstrated when 
counsel's conduct results in a breakdown in the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process so that the trial cannot 
be relied upon to have produced a just result. Strickland, 466 
U.S. at 686 and 696; 80 L.Ed.2d at 692 and 699. Defendant must 
show (1) deficient performance that (2) prejudiced the defense 
and therefore deprived the defendant of a fair trial, a trial 
whose result is reliable. Str ickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 80 
L.Ed.2d at 693. 
Defendant's case involves issues which have never been 
fully tested in a court of law. Though Defendant has had two 
trials on serious criminal charges, his true defense has never 
been presented. During the Defendant's first trial, the defense 
attorneys were not fully aware of all the facts because the 
prosecutor withheld information from them (see John Caine's and 
Maurice Richards' statements, pp. 18-20, supra). On appeal, 
Defendant's case was remanded for a new trial. (See Addendum, 
Exhibit 13.) 
At Defendant's second trial, defense counsel Fletcher 
had the benefit of records of the prior proceedings in which 
much, if not all, of Defendant's obvious defense was set forth. 
She further had the benefit of having spent time with Defendant 
and his father in discussing the case and preparing for it. She 
was fully informed as to the nature of the defense the Defendant 
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was requesting, which was obviously his best defense (R. 2149, 
2151, 2158, and 2923). 
Fletcher's own statements that she was not being paid 
enough to do the trial, that she didn't have time to do the 
trial, that she was more concerned about finishing before the 
July 3 holiday, and that she expected to be fired by the 
Defendant, are evidence that even she understood she was not 
doing the kind of job expected of effective counsel. Further, 
Defendant argues that counsel was not loyal to him nor did she 
consult with nor keep him informed on important decisions, as she 
is required to do. Not calling 20 witnesses after having 
subpoenaed them on important issues, poor cross-examination 
techniques, and lying to the Defendant are all further evidence 
of her ineffective assistance. 
The most obvious failures on part of counsel were her 
failure to present evidence of the Defendant's impaired/ 
incompetent mental condition and her failure to pursue the 
obvious theme of the case in regard to the chain of custody of 
the weapon involved in the shooting. 
Though Defendant did get his "day in court" 
procedurally speaking, Defendant did not get a trial that tested 
the evidence or presented his best case, and Defendant is 
entitled to that testing and presentation. The Defendant was 
deprived of a fair trial whose result is reliable. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant believes that his claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel is completely justified. Based on the 
foregoing issues and arguments, Defendant respectfully requests a 
reversal of his conviction and a new trial ordered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this jZ>l~ day of March, 1989. 
n
 • J * Mi 
ROBERT L. FROERER 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the /? >^day of March, 1989, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, four true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Appellant to R. Paul Van Dam, Attorney 
General, Attorney for Respondent, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake 
City, UT 84114. 
1ERT L. FROERE] 
Attorney for Defendant 
ROBE R
-49-
